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logistics, reconstruction, and security. This paper examines the question as it relates to Army logistics contracting by reviewing recent history and doctrine related to contractors on the battlefield, examining how contractors can offset force structure, and offering case studies of contract costs versus military logistics. The paper also examines the problems with contract logistics and their recommended solutions concluding with a way forward that expands the professional contracting workforce, updates doctrine and training, and strengthens unit oversight of contractor activity -all part of the cost of contract logistics in the U.S. Army. This supposition is implied in the title of the CWC report -"At What Cost?" This paper will examine the "at what cost?" question using case studies of contracted logistics services from Afghanistan and Iraq to determine what Army force structure would be required in the absence of contracted services and will argue that, absent a sea change in U.S. policy, contractors on the battlefield are here to stay. It will examine the business case, in terms of replacement costs, of using military force structure instead of contracted logistics. It will examine the shortfalls of contracted services and the recommendations made by a number of interested parties for addressing issues with contracted logistics. Finally, this paper will make the case that the only rational response is to fully integrate contracted services into military operations to achieve unity of effort and adequate oversight of contract logistics in contingency operations. while suggesting a number of planning considerations for contractor support to the force. 4 The doctrine, however, is silent on the critical questions of when, where and how contractors are best employed to support the force and how they should be managed.
The Field Manual acknowledges this fact: "Currently, there is no specifically identified force structure nor detailed policy on how to establish contractor management oversight within an AOR. Consolidated contractor management is the goal, but reality is that it has been, and continues to be, accomplished through a rather convoluted system…". 5 More importantly, doctrine does not provide the intent, or vision for employment of contractors in the military of the future. 6 Are contractors expected to take over all weapons system maintenance? Should contractors be placed in charge of all logistics and engineering services? Is the strategic vision for contractors related to force structure reductions, cost savings, or some other strategic imperatives? Current Army doctrine is silent on these critical questions and provides little guidance on contractors and the future force. 16 Another common theme identified as a shortfall in COR assignment is unit failure to appoint personnel with expertise in the area they are expected to oversee (i.e. fuel handlers supervising contractors at a fuel facility; engineers supervising construction contractors). 40 percent of respondents in the Afghanistan Forward Operating Base (FOB) Management Survey made specific comments related to the lack of technical expertise in unit appointed CORs. 17 Given genuine concerns about the wisdom of military logistics contracting, its potential corrosive effects on military professionalism and capabilities, and the documented propensity of contracts to waste and fraud, it is no wonder that some might 6 ask, "At What Cost?" Despite drawbacks, contractors provide critical capabilities, and offset force structure in important ways that far outweigh the drawbacks.
Contractors as a Force Multiplier -How do Contractors Offset Force Structure?
The use of contractors on the post-Cold War era battlefield has expanded despite the fact that most commanders, given adequate resources, would prefer to have a pure military force performing the mission. Contractors are used because they offer inherent advantages relative to military forces or because they offer relief from specific resource or policy constraints. As a result, they have become integral to supporting the force. brigade, or 58 percent of logistics. 19 Contractors were the best remedy for this force structure gap and the previously mentioned LOGCAP contracts provided a ready-made, contingency tested solution for force structure strapped commanders.
How did the Force Structure Gap
Contractors bridge other important force structure gaps. 2) Restructure organizations and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management.
3) Provide training and tools for all contracting activities. Gansler's recommendations recognized that the acquisition and contracting workload had increased 600 percent as a result of expeditionary operations, and that this increase was not matched by an increase in the workforce. Its recommendations focused on this realization and the need to rebuild the workforce. Finally, the Rand Corporation Study suggests that the Army's Risk management process be incorporated into sourcing decisions for contractors on the battlefield and suggests that this methodology will suggest the best uses of contract logistics support. 44 It recommends that risk management be applied to sourcing decisions made outside the Army (in Congress and the DOD), in sourcing decisions made in the acquisition community, in force management and design venues and in system design venues in order to best determine the mix of contract and military force structure provided logistics. 45 These studies all point the way for the future of contract logistics in the Army.
Taken individually, they are good ideas, but collectively, implemented as a comprehensive program, they suggest the best way to institutionalize contract logistics.
Institutionalizing contracted logistics means more than just organizational and staffing changes; it also includes inserting contractors into the training and planning processes, training commanders so that they know how to employ contractors, and creation of contract planning staff positions in operational headquarters. 46 The Logisticians in units must be trained to extend their skill sets beyond performing logistics functions to supervising contractors who provide logistics service.
Beyond workforce expansion and additional training and systems, contract services must be packaged into capabilities based "force structure" to standardize their Strategic Planning System. The use of contractors would thus become a strategic decision, with strategic consideration of the associated risks, trade-offs and resources required, as opposed to an operational or tactical decision. This approach will eliminate some flexibility in contracts, but will provide for maximum efficiency of the contracted solution.
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Contractor oversight must also be improved at the unit level. Even with expansion of the professional contract workforce, there will never be enough contracting professionals to provide comprehensive oversight of contractors, so units are required to provide Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) for day-to-day oversight.
Unfortunately, units frequently ignore the requirement, and as a result, contractors go unsupervised. COR training, assignment, and performance of duty must become items of command emphasis if the Army is serious about effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Units and staffs must be trained to fulfill this requirement and effective management systems must be put in place to ensure compliance. 
